XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Empirical Intuitions, Schemata, and Concepts in Kant's Critical Epistemology

Hoke Robinson

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Rousseau
Data: 22 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 09 aprile 2010


Kant's description of the elements involved in empirical cognition, and in particular their origin and use, gives rise to a number of difficulties, especially the apparent necessity that of empirical concepts and empirical intuitions must each precede the other. I address four questions: 1. To what extent are remnants of classical empiricist epistemology still present in Kant's Critical treatment, and can and should these be eliminated? 2. In what way, if at all, do Kant's empirical schemata differ from empirical concepts? 3. In what way do his empirical concepts (and/or schemata) differ from empirical intuitions? 4. What is the origin of empirical concepts, schemata, and intuitions, and how does it relate to the manifold of sense?