XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

Kant on the Generality of Logic

Clinton Tolley

Edificio: Palazzo dei Congressi
Sala: sala Vico
Data: 23 maggio 2010 - 14:30
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


It has become common, especially after Frege, to take truth to play a definitive role in the delimitation of logic. It has also become common to think that Kant shares this truth-theoretic conception of logic. I argue, first, that this gets Kant’s views wrong in an important respect, since Kant defines logic instead as the science of ‘understanding [Verstand]’, and not, in the first instance, as the science of truth. This in turn shows Kant’s ‘general or universal [allgemeine]’ logic to be more general in its scope than Fregean logic, since Kant takes the bounds of understanding to extend beyond the theoretical sphere. I argue, secondly, that Kant’s proposal of a more general logic is required by his commitment to the more than merely nominal unity of theoretical and practical reason. I conclude by linking this view of logic to Kant’s belief in the rational unity of all of philosophy and his faith in the ultimate rationality of human existence.