XI KANT KONGRESS, XI Congresso Kantiano Internazionale

The Imputation Judgment in Kant’s Practical Philosophy

Antonio Marques

Edificio: Facoltà di Agraria
Sala: sala Hume
Data: 25 maggio 2010 - 17:00
Ultima modifica: 13 aprile 2010


Central topic oh this paper is the imputation judgment in the context of Kant’s practical philosophy. The determination of the place and nature of this kind of judgment should not be separated from the problem of real existence of freedom and responsibility in other persons from the perspective of the third person. Particular attention will be given to passages of the Lectures on Ethics and on Metaphysics, where the imputation judgment, which presupposes freedom in other people, is to be understood as the asymmetrical counterpart of the expression of freedom as it is revealed in the first person perspective. Another relevant point of the argumentation corresponds to the clarification of the referred “asymmetry”. Imputation judgment is at the root of moral and juridical propositions and it will be considered how it plays a systematic role in the interior of practical reason as Kant understands it.